Idealidade e experimentação emancipatória da liberdade: uma crítica ao conceito de Liberdade Social de Axel Honneth

Abstract

The aim of this dissertation aims to present a critique of Axel Honneth’s theory of freedom, which is developed in his work Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. Unlike other models of freedom, such as negative freedom and moral freedom, Honneth, through the use of the method of normative reconstruction, defends the idea that the realization of freedom, that is, its process of normative experimentation, is a linked to the model of social freedom. Such defense, in general terms, occurs for two reasons: the first is because social freedom is the social precondition of human action; the second reason is because the social ethos of social freedom, which is Democratic Ethical Life, attests that we are free because they and they are involved in a series of institutionalized social spheres whose normative task is internal to social recognition and individual freedom of each individual. This interpretation of human freedom suggested by the German philosopher, however, presents two problems: the first problem is that Honneh’s reading of the functioning of the Normative Reconstruction method leads to the fact that the normadeja sediment of the socidica spheres has an idealist perspective; as a result, the second problem arises because the author disregards that Democratic Ethical Life is an instance of social life that produces and reproduces social injustices, that is, that engenders forms of Social Pathologies. The hypothesis that might solve these problems, and that I will defend, is the following: the cooperative cultivation of social freedom can be better developed from the nexus between education and social philosophy, where the first element helps in the experimentation of the purpose of the second element, which is the democratic realization of the good life.