Abstract:
This dissertation, based on the Theory of Behavioral Economics known as nudges, aims to investigate the behavior of taxpayers who are domestic employers in order to, through sending messages, seek to understand factors that may influence their decision-making for correct compliance tax obligations, through eSocial domestic employer. In this context, nudges are understood to be any aspect that can influence the architecture of choices, helping to change people's behavior in a predictable way without vetoing free will. To achieve the intended objective, a control group and three treatment groups were created, with an initial sample of 332 taxpayers who were domestic employers who were late in sending their information on eSocial, in which each group received a different message, namely: group 1 - just a reminder about the deadline to declare the eSocial; group 2 - a reminder about the deadline plus
consideration information; group 3 - and a reminder about the deadline plus coercive information. The control group received nothing. Pearson's chi-square test was used for statistical analysis, with p ≤ 0.05 being considered significant. In this analysis, it was observed whether the taxpayers of the groups, compared to the control group, after receiving the letter, had their statement informed or not informed within the correct period. Through statistical analyses, it was identified that group 1, which received only
the reminder about the deadline, did not present a statistically significant difference compared to the control group, which received nothing. Group 2 showed a statistical difference, indicating the effect of the reminder on the deadline plus the consideration information. As for group 3, which received the reminder about the deadline plus the coercive information, a statistically significant difference was demonstrated, and its effects were the greatest when compared to the other groups. The difference of this group 3 was 20.35% greater than the group that received the payment message, 24.32% greater than the group that only received the reminder with the deadline and 58.81% greater than the control group that received nothing. The results suggest that coercive messages increase the taxpayer's perception of risk, as they also understand that they are subject to effective oversight by the tax authorities.
