A gênese social dos valores morais no último Lukács

Abstract

The difficulties of the contemporary philosophical debate in dealing with specifically moral problems, as they are enunciated by the obstacles of individuation developed by the new social relations, in addition to the opportunistic use of morality by neofascism, go back to the diagnosis of the hungarian philosopher György Lukács about the need for the constitution of a tertium datur for the reduction of ethics to the alternatives of relativistic historicism and metaphysical dogmatism. Imbued with such perspective, the marxist philosopher projected an ambitious theoretical itinerary around the understanding of morality, combining historicity and social objectivity. The death of the author, however, bequeathed to posterity only the background work for further ethical reflection, an ontology of the social being, and the notes organized by the philosopher to guide his own writing. The aim of this study is to compare these remaining texts, so that Lukács' contribution to the understanding of the social genesis of moral value can be systematized. For that, the reconstruction of his thinking starts from the conditions of human self-production, which consolidate the use value as the first form of valuation, following his mediation with the development of sociality that provides bases for the formation of moral value and, finally, the problems related to the historical and objective development of morality and the discontinuities of its appropriation by social individuals. Thus, we intend to systematize the status that Lukács gives to moral value, through its social genesis, placing it in the complex of complexes of human action.