Nomeação no tractatus de Wittgenstein

Abstract

This dissertation deals with the sense in which “naming” becomes a relevant puzzle in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. After all, the requirement to which it reports goes back to the logical conditions that must satisfy each meaningful discourse. By one hand, every proposition ensures its representative competence insofar as it maintains the same logical multiplicity, at the same time as it shall be composed by the same number of elements that the fact it represents. In a relevant sense, the truth conditions of the proposition is based on the formal identity that world and language share between them. Therefore, a name corresponds to an object, and the set of combinatorial possibilities that characterize its syntax in the language mirrors the combinatorial possibilities of elements constituent of the fact. By the other hand, this formal identity do not decide for the meaning played by a name. Ties that bind names to objects, pictorial relations are not essentially fixed, being rather settled on the basis of a field of alternatives. This field of operation, although limited by the syntax, is not determined by them. Thus, while the syntactic rules mirrors the necessary order of the substance in the world, semantic rules must reflect a determination that, strictly, is perfectly indifferent to a logical point of view. In principle, at the limits of the isomorphism, naming determination can be always changed without compromise its representative competence. In a relevant sense, the logical syntax of a name is completely unresponsive to its semantic, namely, to the precise meaning that a name assumes at the proposition. Thus, although shall the logic be responsible to establish the syntactic category of a name, as well as to determine that a precise meaning must be established, the logic can not establish what this meaning is. Although essential to the constitution of the sense, this determination is logically irrelevant. This text aims to investigate the tension raised by these essential necessity and indifference.