Resumen:
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze how party organizations select their candidates
in the Brazilian political and electoral system by comparing the selection processes carried out
by twelve parties (PT, DEM, MDB, PSDB, PSB, PPS, PV, PRB, PSC, PTN, PCdoB and
PSOL), based on the position of city councilor in the 2016 elections in the capital of Bahia.
As well as understanding electoral strategies, the formal and informal rules that interfere with
the composition of the final lists. The paper is theoretically embedded in the field of study
that has not yet been studied in Brazil, which considers the selection of candidates as a crucial
part of legislative recruitment within political parties. For this comparative purpose, the
concept of institutionalization of the organizational model of Panebianco (2005) is used. With
such a theoretical model, we try to answer the following question: To what extent does the
degree of institutionalization of party organizations affect the differences between candidate
selection processes? This thesis sought to understand the following dimensions of selection:
the first was to delve into the electoral strategies adopted by the parties; the second dimension
was the analysis of the formal rules present in electoral and statutory legislation; the third and
main stage consisted in unraveling the secret garden of the informal rules of selection through
in-depth interviews with the gatekeepers of these parties to demonstrate in real life how they
control the drafting of the final lists of nominations; and finally through the application of 120
questionnaires between the other actors involved (candidates and non-candidates), it was also
intended to discuss the profiles of these actors, to compare the information provided by the
leaders and to discover other informalities in the selection. In addition to these dimensions,
the research sought to investigate one of the consequences of the party function of selecting
candidates: demographic representativeness through the social composition of the actors
involved in recruitment and party lists. The conclusion reached is that party leaders decide
and control the selection processes, however limited by electoral strategies and less by the
informal rules that they establish.
