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dc.creatorSantos, Rafael Fernandes Mendes dos-
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-01T13:38:23Z-
dc.date.available2024-08-01-
dc.date.available2024-08-01T13:38:23Z-
dc.date.issued2024-06-21-
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/39718-
dc.description.abstractThe connections between Cavell's philosophy of ordinary language (OLP) and the themes of skepticism, the possibility of attributing meaning to language and self-knowledge are ways of thinking about the conditions for expressing situations of the mind (plights of mind) and the circumstances that allow an individual to communicate a specific human condition. In this sense, the most common and natural uses of ordinary language reveal a starting point for claiming mutual recognition of actions and words. In Cavell's OLP, the epistemic status of the Wittgensteinian notion of criterion implies a view of the relations between individuals and between them and the world are based on a critique of the skeptical claim for indubitable knowledge. This means that meaningful bonds between people seeking to communicate in concrete situations of intersubjective interaction depend on an acceptance of the fragile nature of agreements, on judgments that establish the criteria for meaningful uses of language. In this way, the ordinary language philosophy is linked to the possibilities of self-knowledge based on a claim to the other to recognize the criteria that guide subjective expressions, such as expressions of love, joy, pain, discontent, etc. as a way of communicating a human condition in a specific context of intersubjective interaction. In this thesis, I try to approach these themes based on interlocutions between Cavell, Kripke, Descartes, Shakespeare and Wittgenstein, in order to suggest OLP as a philosophical activity that aims to clarify the conditions of mutuality, in other words, the conditions for effective intersubjective communication, and which leads to self-knowledge.pt_BR
dc.description.sponsorshipCNPQpt_BR
dc.languageporpt_BR
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal da Bahiapt_BR
dc.rightsAcesso Abertopt_BR
dc.subjectLinguagem ordináriapt_BR
dc.subjectCeticismopt_BR
dc.subjectAutoconhecimentopt_BR
dc.subjectSubjetividadept_BR
dc.subject.otherOrdinary languagept_BR
dc.subject.otherSkepticismpt_BR
dc.subject.otherSelf-knowledgept_BR
dc.subject.otherSubjectivitypt_BR
dc.titleAutoconhecimento, ceticismo e linguagem na filosofia de Stanley Cavellpt_BR
dc.title.alternativeSelf-knowledge, skepticism and language in Stanley Cavell's philosophypt_BR
dc.typeTesept_BR
dc.publisher.programPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia (PPGF) pt_BR
dc.publisher.initialsUFBApt_BR
dc.publisher.countryBrasilpt_BR
dc.subject.cnpqCNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIApt_BR
dc.contributor.advisor1Azize , Rafael Lopes-
dc.contributor.referee1Medeiros, Eduardo Vicentini de-
dc.contributor.referee2Silva, Anderson Bogéa da-
dc.contributor.referee3Silva, João Carlos Salles Pires da-
dc.contributor.referee4Silva Filho, Waldomiro José da-
dc.contributor.referee5Azize, Rafael Lopes-
dc.creator.Latteshttp://lattes.cnpq.br/3545407801701607pt_BR
dc.description.resumoAs conexões da filosofia da linguagem ordinária (FLO) de Cavell com os temas do ceticismo, da possibilidade de atribuir significado à linguagem e do autoconhecimento constituem maneiras de pensar as condições para expressar situações da mente (plight of mind) e as circunstâncias que permitem ao indivíduo comunicar uma condição humana específica. Nesse sentido, os usos mais comuns e naturais de uma linguagem ordinária revelam um ponto de partida para a reivindicação do reconhecimento mútuo de ações e palavras. Na FLO de Cavell, o estatuto epistêmico da noção wittgensteiniana de critério implica uma visão das relações entre os indivíduos e deles com o mundo assentada na crítica à reivindicação cética por conhecimento indubitável. Isso significa que os vínculo significativos entre pessoas que buscam se comunicar, em situações concretas de interação intersubjetiva, dependem de uma aceitação da natureza frágil dos acordos em juízos que estabelecem os critérios para usos significativos da linguagem. Assim, a filosofia da linguagem ordinária se vincula às possibilidades de autoconhecimento a partir de uma reivindicação ao outro do reconhecimento dos critérios que orientam expressões subjetivas, a exemplo das expressões de amor, alegria, dor, descontentamento etc. como forma de comunicar uma condição humana num contexto específico de interação intersubjetiva. Nesta tese, procuro abordar esses temas a partir de interlocuções entre Cavell, Kripke, Descartes, Shakespeare e Wittgenstein, para sugerir a FLO como uma atividade filosófica que pretende esclarecer as condições de mutualidade, ou seja, as condições para uma efetiva comunicação intersubjetiva, e que enseje autoconhecimento.pt_BR
dc.publisher.departmentFaculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (FFCH)pt_BR
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