Resumo:
According to the theory of political budget cycles, incumbent governments tend to expand expenditures during pre-electoral periods, especially in areas valued by voters. This fiscal manipulation aims to direct resources toward strategic sectors in order to increase the chances of remaining in power. However, the behavior of incumbents in pre-electoral periods, focused on electoral benefits, may generate losses both for public management and for the perception transmitted to the electorate, masking the real competencies of the governing authority. The objective of this research is to verify whether incumbents engage in fiscal manipulation to secure advantages for themselves and their political groups. To this end, the study uses data from electoral periods in 417 municipalities in the state of Bahia from 2000 to 2020. The study adopts panel data econometric methods to identify and measure the magnitude of political budget cycles. Evidence is found that, during pre-election periods, candidates implement fiscal adjustments, aligning the budget with voters’ preferences in pursuit of political advantage for themselves or their groups.
