Resumo:
Bertrand Russell, through his theory of judgment, undertakes a logical investigation on the
epistemological distinctions, whose result should be the identification of the formal conditions
of distinction between a false judgment and a true judgment, after the analysis of the formal
conditions of a judgment whichever it may be, in which context the propositional sense would
objectify. Thus, the subject of this research is Russell’s theory of judgment, particularly in the
period from 1910 to 1913, in which he presents 3 distinct versions of his theory: the one
which is found in a 1910 essay, entitled “Of the Nature of Truth an Falsehood”, published in
the Philosophical Essays; the 1912 version, presented in the text “Truth and Falsehood”,
chapter XII of the book Problems of Philosophy; and the 1913 version, of the unfinished
manuscript Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript, posthumously published in 1974. In
those works, trying to objectify the propositional sense, Russell conceives judgment as a
multiple relation, which raises problems of logical order, which his theory manages to
accomplish, always up to a certain point. Our paper cuts out, therefore, the philosophical
universe of the Russellian thought, turning to the reasons for the difficulties found by Russell
in his logical undertaking. We will emphasize the singularity of each one of the versions, but
we will also emphasize the continuity of his undertaking, so that difference and similarity will
form a single route, translating not only the degree of difficulty but also the importance of the
problem for a logical project such as Russell’s. With that, on examining the whole of those
problems and of the internal solutions to that project, we believe to be, in some way,
contributing to the understanding of his philosophy as a whole, as we emphasize a constant
feature of his way to deal with logical difficulties.
