Resumo:
The present dissertation aims to offer an analysis of Richard Rorty's interpretation of
Freudian theory, with special attention to the absence of the concept of resistance, a
problem recognized by the author himself. Interested in Freud's contribution to moral
reflection, Rorty elaborates his interpretation by emphasizing the conversational aspect
of the psychic instances, thus softening the dimension of conflict present in Freud. Part
of Rorty's argumentative strategy is to eliminate the metapsychological explanation,
which makes it difficult to attempt a redescription of the concept of resistance
compatible with this reading. It remains to be seen what consequences result from the
absence of this concept. We argue here that such absence derives from the philosophical
choices on which Rorty bases his interpretation. In this way, we try to present Rorty's
assumptions regarding philosophy and interpretation. The clarification of the meaning
and relevance of the Freudian concept of resistance was also developed to highlight the
distinctions between Freud and the interpretation offered. The work is complemented
with the support of Roy Schafer, who offers a redescription of the resistance that in our
judgment is compatible with the proposal rortyana.
