Sartre e a crítica da reificação: conflito social e reconhecimento

Abstract

Our thesis is that, based on the thoughts of Jean-Paul Sartre, conflicts in the struggle for recognition of other human beings are not a means to an end, that is, there is no reconciliation or symmetry in this struggle. On the contrary, it is through the continuation of a permanent conflict that we can speak of recognition, even if it is not symmetrical. This is our general position in this research, while our specific position is reflected in the understanding that recognition should always be asymmetric or dissymmetric rather than something symmetric. For us, reciprocal recognition must occur in an asymmetrical way, otherwise in a relationship with another there would be no recognition of the existence of that other as alterity. Our position is that although many see reciprocity in recognition as necessitating symmetry, our thesis argues that recognition can exist without symmetry. This is the essence of our argument. So how can Sartre's social philosophy contribute to contemporary debates about recognition? We will try to answer this question. Honneth, one of the main people responsible for the contemporary renewal of recognition theory, claimed to have identified Sartre as the most important of post-World War II French writers. However, he also professes to overcome Sartrean limitations: on the one hand, Sartre offers a partial view of the concept of recognition, seeing the other as a reification; on the other hand, Honneth argues that his theory addresses the topic more comprehensively. Given this, we will explore how Honneth's critique of Sartre's thought can highlight Sartre's continued relevance for a theory of recognition. We will use Sartre's work as a basis for analyzing Sartre's interpretation of Honneth, thus demonstrating Sartre's lasting importance in this field. The research will begin with a report on Honneth's proposal and his interpretative reading of Sartre, in order to emphasize the way in which this interpretation intersects and differs from the approach to recognition that Sartre derives from his phenomenological ontology. We do not intend to provide an exhaustive account of the pros and cons of Honneth's critique of Sartre. Our aim is rather to show that our own interpretation of Sartre's philosophy can pave the way for exploring ideas that could improve current debates about recognition.