O método de Hume

Abstract

This is an interpretation of Hume’s philosophy which aims to prove that its originality lies not in the critique of causality, bu rather in its pars construens: the insertion of the principle of Habit as a the foundation of judgments concerning matters of fact. I pretend, therefore, to show that Hume’s philosophy divides all human inquiry into two domains – the empirical and the logical –, putting a different principle to rule each domain: respectively, Habit and Reason. A consequence of that, as well as of the critique of causality, is the uniformity between nature and human nature with regards to science: in both of them, one must equally look for constant conjunctions so that one can assert causal relations and than determine matters of fact. After all, Hume’s philosophy is skeptical just as it gives up from that absolute certainty sought in Cartesian times; actually, it aims the construction of knowledge – what must be accomplished by following his method for judging matters of fact.