Resumo:
The main goal of this work is the understanding of thought as an essential condition for the use of language as a picture of reality according to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The picture theory, as is commonly known, is one of the central theses of Tractatus that seeks to describe what conditions are essential for that the language can represent the reality, i.e., to be possible talking truly or falsely of how things are. The essential conditions for that the picture occurs were initially identified as: (1) the bipolarity of the proposition; (2) all picture should have a structure; (3) all picture should have a form of representation; (4) all picture should have a picture relation; (5) all picture should have a logical form. For some interpreters of the Tractatus, there is no need for any other condition. However, others argue that there is another prerequisite for that the picture occurs, which is the thought as an intentional element.
To investigate the requirement of thought as an essential condition of picturing, was performed the following research strategy: after the introduction, in the second chapter, the general aspects of Tractatus was presented, according to the traditional interpretation, enabling the reader a not problematic overview of the book. In the third chapter, were debated some aspects of the book that help the understanding of certain aspects of the central discussion of this dissertation. These discussed aspects were: (a) what are the objects, in the Tractatus; (b) what truth theory is presented in the book; (c) if there is or not a realism in the Tractatus. After examining these points, then, in the fourth chapter, were made the analysis of what should be the essential conditions to picture occurs in propositions.
By analyzing the interpretations that argue that there is not an intentional element in the Tractatus and the contrary views, it concludes that the word "thought" is an ambiguous term and should be understood, depending on the context it is used, sometimes in a logical sense, sometimes in a psychological sense and sometimes as a psychological act, an act that performs the projection of reality in the proposition, therefore, an essential condition to the use of language as a picture of reality.